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In this paper, we examine welfare implications of switching from
a neutrality regime to a network management regime. While in the
former a network provider or an integrated ISP should transmit data
with a-bit-is-a-bit principle, in the latter it is allowed to diﬀerenti-
ate its connection quality considering economic value of data packets
transmitted from content or application providers to end-users. The
diﬀerentiation indicates allowing the ISP to apply QoS arrangements
for quality-sensitive contents or applications. The above issues are
ﬁrst examined with a model in which there is a monopolist ISP, and
later it is extended through introducing duopoly competition. Our
results refer some potential gains that can be captured through net-
work management regime. Although the overall eﬀect of deviation
from neutrality regime on total surplus may not deﬁned clearly, both
in monopoly and in duopoly models we have found that end-users and
quality-sensitive content or application providers beneﬁt from network
management regime, in case of enough increase in quality of connec-
tion oﬀered by ISP(s).And, regular content or application providers
suﬀer with decreasing connection quality because of ﬁxed network ca-
pacity.
JEL codes: L12, L13, L15, L51, L96
Keywords: Telecommunications, Internet, Network Neutrality,
Network Management Two-Sided Market, Quality of Service
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11 Introduction
Internet, and recently broadband Internet, has become an indispensable part
of our daily life. Through the broadband Internet, end-users(EUs) can bene-
ﬁt diﬀerent kinds of applications such as streaming media, on-line games,
VoIP, etc. along with traditional services such as mail services or web-
browsing. Bandwidth need for the mentioned quality-sensitive applications,
and growing user demand on such content provoke network providers to in-
vest more on their networks. On the other hand, it has been largely argued
that increasing marginal value of bandwidth for the Internet services incites
network providers, or integrated internet service providers (ISPs) to discrimi-
nate against content or application providers (CAPs). These kinds of actions
are claimed to be threatening the neutral architecture of the Internet. And,
it is commonly argued that this neutral architecture or network neutrality is
the primary rule of the Internet that ensures open and equal access for any
CAP. The debate has a growing importance, since the famous Madison River
case in 2005. And, with the recent proposal by Google and Verizon it gains
another dimension about managing internet traﬃc.
Although the debate seems mostly technical, in practice it indicates some
important short-run and also long-run issues. For instance, while advocates
of neutrality regime claim that network neutrality ensures the users’ access
freedom and gives incentives to CAPs for innovation at the edge, opponents
argue that mandated network neutrality discourages network providers in-
centives to invest on their networks. Hence, as Peha et.al. [8] suggest the
debate may greatly inﬂuence the variety of CAPs available for users, business
models for service providers, and modes of development of social communi-
cation.
In fact, the network neutrality debate contains basically two distinct is-
sues: discrimination and quality of service (QoS) [7]. Network neutrality is a
non-discriminatory regime, and any deviation from it should be considered as
a discriminatory action. Discrimination may contain a large scale of actions,
from blocking to charging diﬀerent prices for the same service. Although the
economic theory addresses some welfare enhancing results of certain types of
price discrimination, practices like blocking reduce competition and economic
welfare.
On the other hand, a network neutrality regime would not allow diﬀer-
entiation between data packets according to their economic value. In other
words, no matter what the data contains it would be transmitted with the
2same eﬀort, generally called best-eﬀort. More technically, the data packets
are conveyed considering a-bit-is-a-bit principle. Actually, economic value of
a content or an application is closely related with its utility for the users, and
the revenue derived by its providers. However, under a regime of network
neutrality this phenomenon is ignored, and all contents or all applications
are treated equally. For instance, data for web browsing or for an e-mail mes-
sage and data quality-sensitive applications such as VoIP or on-line games
are subject to the same QoS. Thus, one can argue a potential welfare loss
may occur with this equal treatment.
This paper speciﬁcally considers this issue with a formal model. Particu-
larly, it aims to examine welfare implications of a network neutrality regime
substituted with a network management regime. While in the former ISP(s)
should transmit data from CAPs with a-bit-is-a-bit principle , in the latter
it is allowed to diﬀerentiate its service. The diﬀerentiation indicates allowing
ISP(s) to serve with a diﬀerent connection quality for quality-sensitive con-
tents or applications. The above issues are ﬁrst examined with a model in
which there is a monopolist ISP, and later it is extended through introducing
duopoly competition.
To avoid misleading implications, the model is constructed considering
the two-sided nature of the Internet. Allowing for an ISP as a platform
which enables interaction between EUs on one side, and CAPs on the other
side; render the Internet as a two-sided market. In addition, the fundamental
features of a two-sided market cited by Rochet and Tirole [10] are valid for
the Internet as well. Furthermore, competition issues examined by Rochet
and Tirole [9] and Armstrong [1] for the two-sided markets would also be a
guide for the extended version of our model with duopoly competition.
After modeling the Internet as a two-sided market, we compute the mar-
ket equilibrium for both regimes: network neutrality and network manage-
ment. Then, we examine the incentive of the monopolist ISP to deviate
from neutrality regime through comparing its proﬁt derived in both regimes.
And, we have found that it derives more proﬁt through deviation. Then, we
evaluate the welfare implication of such a deviation. Our ﬁndings suggest
that while the ISP, EUs and quality-sensitive CAPs beneﬁt from network
management regime, regular CAPs are hurt. In the extended version of the
model with the duopoly competition, although we have ambiguous result for
the incentive of the ISPs, the rest of the ﬁndings address similar results.
There is a tiny but growing economic literature on the network neutral-
ity debate. However related works to our scope can be examined in three
3categories:
The ﬁrst category can be represented by Hermalin and Katz [5], which
emphasizes on content providers with diﬀerentiated products. In their model,
content providers diﬀer in their attractiveness of their content. And, they
are free to choose their connection quality to the network. However, un-
der neutrality regime ISP(s) is restricted to oﬀer a single connection quality.
Although the impact on total surplus is ambiguous, negative eﬀects are ob-
served through exclusion of certain types of content providers. Although
our model speciﬁcation is diﬀerent, we have observed similar implications as
Hermalin and Katz [5].
The second category emphasizes on congestion issue on the Internet around
the neutrality debate [2], [3], [6]. These works examine both short-run and
long-run eﬀects of deviation from neutrality. These works diﬀer from ours in
two points: First, we do not explicitly employ the congestion issue, but we
wanted to assign a similar eﬀect through specifying diﬀerent CAPs for their
quality of connection needs. Second, we concentrate on the short-run eﬀects
of deviation from neutrality by imposing ﬁxed network capacity.
The third category is represented by Economides and T˚ ag [4], which
examine the network neutrality debate from a two-sided market perspective
through emphasizing on externalities speciﬁc to two-sided markets. We used
similar speciﬁcations with the authors for the EUs on one side, and CAPs on
the other side of the market. In addition, as the authors did, we extended
our model with duopoly competition. However, Economides and T˚ ag [4] do
not consider a network management regime in the sense that certain CAPs
are treated with diﬀerent quality-connection than the others.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The second section intro-
duces the main model with a monopolist ISP. In this section, ﬁrst we model
the Internet as a two-sided market. Then, we examine welfare implications
through switching to network management regime. In the third section, we
extend the main model introducing duopoly competition, and examine the
eﬀects of competition on welfare. In the fourth section, we will conclude with
some remarks.
42 The Model
2.1 Modeling the Internet as a two-sided market
In our two-sided market model, EUs)reside on one side and CAPs reside on
the the other side of the market. Between these two sides, an integrated ISP
operates as a platform.
The ISP controls the two-sided market as a monopolist. Under a network
neutrality regime, it oﬀers linear pricing contract to EUs for subscription, but
it is not allowed to charge any CAPs. We assume that the ISP has a single
cost per EU (c) to transmit data from CAPs to EUs. And, it serves with
an identical connection quality for each CAPs, z. This identical connec-
tion quality level can also be considered as best-eﬀort level. On the other
hand, under network management regime, the ISP is allowed to discriminate
between CAPs. More speciﬁcally, the ISP can charge certain CAPs for an
additional QoS (z). We assume that we are in short-run, and we eliminate
any expansion or upgrade in network capacity. So the additional connection
quality appears as prioritization, and this does not create any additional cost
for the ISP. However, as the capacity of the network does not change, the
prioritization for certain CAPs results a reduction of the initial connection
quality level for the rest of the CAPs. Then, the ISP’s general proﬁt function
can be formulated as
Π = n(p − c) + NQP (1)
where n denotes the number EUs connected to the internet and p represent
the linear price charged for the connection. On the other hand, under network
management regime NQ indicates the number CAPs which provides quality-
sensitive contents or applications which gives a fee (P) for the provision of
additional connection quality.
CAPs consist of variety of content or application providers. They are
not substitutes and they do not compete with each other. Their sole revenue
source is advertising revenue, which is a function of both number of viewers
and the connection quality. Their ﬁxed set-up cost (T) are diﬀerent from
each other. We assume that they are uniformly distributed in a interval,
[0,1] according to their ﬁxed set-up costs.
Furthermore, in order to diﬀerentiate the services of CAPs, we made a
distinction according to their quality-sensitiveness for their products. We
assume that while some of the CAPs provide regular services which need less
5connection quality, other CAPs provide contents or applications which need
more connection quality. These diﬀerences in needs of diﬀerent connection
quality can also be observed in their revenue measure on advertisement. We
assume that quality-sensitive CAPs’ (CAPsQ) revenue measure is greater
than the regular CAPs’(CAPsR), which is expressed by ΩQ > ΩR.
While under neutrality regime the ISP is not allowed to exploit this dif-
ference, under network management regime it is allowed to do it. More
speciﬁcally, the ISP allowed to charge CAPsQ with a fee P, for an addi-
tional connection quality, z. Thus, proﬁt function of marginal CAPs with
the locations y and j for CAPsR and for CAPsQ are
UR = ΩR(z − z)n − Ty, (2)
UQ = ΩQ(z + z)n − P − Tj (3)
where we assume the additional connection quality level is smaller that the
initial level (z > z).
EUs consist of variety of internet consumers. Their valuation of being
connected to the internet is diﬀerent from each other because of variety of
reasons. We assume that they are uniformly distributed according to their
preferences of valuation from higher to lower on an interval, [0,1]. And, they
faces a unit cost (t) to be connected to the ISP. This cost is also interpreted
as a diﬀerentiation parameter for EUs.
EUs gain positive utility to be able to visit diﬀerent kinds of CAPs. On
the other hand, their utility is sensitive for connection quality. Hence, EUs’
utility is an increasing function of both for the number of CAPs connected
to the platform and their connection quality. However, we assume that EUs
marginal value for additional CAPs and for their connection quality diﬀers
according to type of contents or applications. In other words, EUs give more
value on quality-sensitive services such as games, voice or video telephony,
etc. than the regular services; ωQ > ωR. Therefore, the utility of a marginal
EU located at x can be written as
u = v + ωR(z − z)NR + ωQ(z + z)NQ − p − tx (4)
where v is the intrinsic value of EU gains from to be connected to the ISP,
NR and NQ are the number of CAPRandQ, and p is fee charged by the ISP. 1
1We assume that v > c.
62.2 Under network neutrality regime
Under network neutrality regime, we assume that the ISP is not allowed to
diﬀerentiate its service among the CAPs (z = 0). Hence, the ISP oﬀer a a
ﬁxed connection quality at z for both types of CAPs.
2.2.1 Demand for the ISP
Demand for the ISP requires to ﬁnd the demand from both side of the market
which can be represented by market participation of EUs, and both types of













R represent the expected market participation for CAPsQ
and CAPsR, respectively.
The expected demand for the other side of the market can be calculated










where ne represents the EUs’ expected market participation.
At fulﬁlled expectations, where ne = n, Ne
Q = NQ, and Ne
R = NR,
throughout simultaneous solution of equations 5, 6, and 7, we arrive to de-
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. (10)
72.2.2 The monopoly ISP
Considering the demand from both side of the market, the ISP’s problem is
to set optimal price that maximize
Π(p) = n(p − c). (11)
First order condition (d
dp = 0) gives us the optimal price for the ISP
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4(tT − z2 (ωQΩQ + ωRΩR))
(16)
which is positive satisﬁed from the second-order conditions.
2.3 Network Management Regime
Now we suppose that the ISP is allowed to manage its network through
diﬀerentiating its service in terms of its quality. In fact, under network
management regime the ISP has an opportunity to charge CAPQ for an
increase connection quality to z + z. However, as mentioned earlier, since
there is not any capacity expansion in the network, the connection quality
level ready for CAPR decreases to z − z.
2The second order conditions require tT − z2 (!QΩQ + !RΩR⟩0.
82.3.1 Demand for the ISP
Following the same steps as in the previous subsection, one can ﬁnd the
demand for the ISP at fulﬁlling expectations. However, now the market
participation of the units is not only a function of p, but also a function of
charge for CAPQ (P)for the additional connection quality:
n(p,P) =
T(v − p) − PωQ (z + z)
tT − ωRΩR (z − z)
2 − ωQΩQ (z + z)
2, (17)
NR(p,P) =
ΩR (z − z)(T(p − v) + PωQ (z + z))
T
(
tT − ωRΩR (z − z)




T(v − p)ΩQ (z + z) − P
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tT − ωRΩR (z − z)
2 − ωQΩQ (z + z)
2) . (19)
2.3.2 The monopoly ISP in deviation
Considering the demand from both side of the market, the ISP’s problem
now is to set optimal prices p and P, that maximize its proﬁt, which was
given in equation 1. First order conditions (@
@p = 0 and @
@P = 0) gives us the
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− cω2
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2 − (c + v)ωQΩQ (z + z)
2 − vΩ2
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tT − ωRΩR (z − z)
2)
− (z + z)
2 (ωQ + ΩQ) 2 (21)
.
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2 (ωQ + ΩQ) 2, (22)
3The second order conditions require tT − !RΩR (z − z)
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(
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2 (ωQ + ΩQ) 2. (24)






tT − ωRΩR (z − z)
2)
− (z + z)
2 (ωQ + ΩQ) 2 (25)
which is positive satisﬁed from the second-order conditions.
2.4 Incentive of the ISP to diﬀerentiate
After obtaining the proﬁts under network neutrality and network manage-
ment regime, now we can examine incentive of the ISP to diﬀerentiate its
service. In doing so, we compare the proﬁts obtained in each regime, and
observe the change in. Since we are interested in observing the incentive to
deviate from neutrality, if there exist any, we look at change in proﬁt through





tT − ωRΩR (z − z)
2)
− (z + z)
2 (ωQ + ΩQ) 2−
T(v − c)2
4(tT − ωQΩQz2 − ωRΩRz2)
> 0
(26)
which is positive if (ωQ + ΩQ) 2 > 4ωRΩR. This condition implies suﬃcient
diﬀerentiation between regular and quality sensitive services, in terms of their
marginal values for EUs and marginal revenues for CAPs.
2.5 Welfare Implications
2.5.1 Welfare under neutrality regime
Considering our model in neutrality regime, we have four diﬀerent parties in
the market, EUs, CAPRs, CAPQs, and the the monopolist ISP. Then, the
welfare in this market consists of surpluses of the indicated parties:
10TotalSurplus
    
TS =
End userSurplus
    
EUS +
RegularCAPSurplus
      
CAPRS +
QualityCAPSurplus
      
CAPQS +
ISP′sProt     
PS .
(27)
The components of the above expression are determined throughout the
equilibrium market participation and proﬁt maximizing price of the ISP. The
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Then, the total surplus under neutrality regime is
TS
NN =
T(c − v)2 (
3tT − z2 (
2ωQΩQ − Ω2
Q + 2ωRΩR − Ω2
R
))
8(tT − z2 (ωQΩQ + ωRΩR)) 2 . (32)
which is positive satisﬁed from the second-order conditions.
2.5.2 Welfare under network management regime
Considering the market participation in both side of the market under net-
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Then, the total surplus under network management regime is
TS
NM =
T(c − v)2 (
4tT + 4Ω2
R (z − z)
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2
which is positive considering the previously imposed conditions.
2.5.3 Assessments
This subsection investigates welfare eﬀects throughout comparing surpluses
under network management regime with under neutrality regime. Since we
are interested in observing the implications of deviation from neutrality,
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> 0
12which is positive for suﬃciently larger t and T parameters, and the condition
required for the incentive to deviate for the ISP; (ωQ + ΩQ) 2 > 4ωRΩR.
The change in surplus of regular CAPs surplus is calculated through the
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< 0
which is negative for suﬃciently larger t and T parameters.
The change in quality sensitive CAPs surplus is calculated through the
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> 0
which is positive for suﬃciently larger increase in additional connection qual-
ity (ωQ (z + z) − ΩQ (z − z) > 0).
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Qz2 − 2ωRΩRz2 + Ω2
Rz2
(tT − z2 (ωQΩQ + ωRΩR)) 2
)
which is undetermined. But considering the increases in EUS, CAPQS, and
the ISP’s proﬁt, one can argue that change in total surplus in the market
may be positive, if the decrease in CAPRS is oﬀset.
133 An Extension: Duopoly Competition
This section extends the previous model through introducing an additional
platform. In other words, in this section we have duopoly platform compe-
tition between two identical ISPs. During this section we assume that each
EU is connected to the internet through a sole ISP, and CAPs serve through
both ISPs.
3.1 Duopoly competition in two sided-market
Now there are two competing ISPs that control the two-sided market,
ISPi where iϵ{1,2}. As in the monopoly model, under the network neutrality
regime, they oﬀer linear pricing contract to EUs for subscription, but they
are not allowed to charge any CAPs. And, they give identical service for
each CAPs, which has the same connection quality, z. And similarly, under
network management regime, the ISPs are allowed to discriminate between
CAPs. We assume the ISPs are identical for their quality of transmission
and for their costs. Then, the ith ISP’s proﬁt function is
Πi = (pi − c)ni + PiNQi. (42)
CAPs are deﬁned as in the monopoly model above. Thus, proﬁt function
of marginal CAPs in both type, which serve through the ISPi, are
URi = ΩR (z − z)ni − Ty, (43)
and
UQi = ΩQ (z + z)ni − Pi − Tj. (44)
EUs are assumed to be uniformly distributed over an interval [0,1], as
in the monopoly model. However, here we assume that two ISPs are located
at the edges of this interval. More speciﬁcally, while ISP1 resides at 0, ISP2
resides at 1. Thus, for a marginal EU who resides at x, the cost to connect
to ISP1 and ISP2 can be cited as tx and (1 − x)t, respectively. Then, the
utility of a marginal consumer for each ISPs are 4
u1 = v + ωR (z − z)NR1 + ωQ (z + z)NQ1 − p1 − tx, (45)
4Here we assume a full market coverage for the EUs to simplify our calculation.
14and
u2 = v + ωR (z − z)NR2 + ωQ (z + z)NQ2 − p2 − (1 − x)t. (46)
3.2 Under network neutrality regime
Under the neutrality regime, one can follow the same steps as in the monopoly
model, and ﬁnd the the the market participation of the EUs and the CAPs
at the fulﬁlling expectations. Then, the proﬁt the proﬁt maximizing ISPs
take into account the demand from both side of the market and solve their
problem of setting the proﬁt maximizing prices. The ﬁrst order condition
(
di
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T
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Then considering the above mentioned market participation from both




Tt − (ωQΩQ + ωRΩR)z2
2T
(51)
which is positive satisﬁed by the second order conditions.
3.3 Under network management regime
Now we assume the ISPs are allowed to diﬀerentiate their services throughout
charging certain CAPs for additional connection quality as in the monopoly
model. Again, one can follow the same steps as in the monopoly model, and
5The second order conditions require tT − (!QΩQ + !RΩR)z2 > 0
15ﬁnd the the market participation of the EUs and the CAPs at the fulﬁlling
expectations. Then, the proﬁt the proﬁt maximizing ISPs take into account
the demand from both side of the market and solve their problem of setting
the proﬁt maximizing prices. However, now the ISPs’ problem includes to
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. (56)
Then considering the above mentioned market participation from both
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which is positive for suﬃciently larger t and T parameters.
3.4 Incentive of the duopoly ISPs to diﬀerentiate
After obtaining the proﬁts under network neutrality and network manage-
ment regime, now we can examine incentive of duopoly ISPs to diﬀerentiate
its service. As in the previous model, we compare the proﬁts obtained in each
regime, and observe the change in. And, since we are interested in observing
6The second order conditions require tT − !RΩR (z − z)
2 − !QΩQ (z + z)
2 > 0
16the incentive to deviate from neutrality, we look at change in proﬁt through
deviation: ∆Πi = ΠNM
i − ΠNN
i . This is
∆Πi =
8zωRΩR (2z − z) − ω2
Q (z + z)
2 − Ω2
Q (z + z)
2 − 2ωQΩQ (3z2 + 6zz − z2)
16T
(58)
which gives us an ambiguous result about incentive of duopoly ISPs to dif-
ferentiate its service. This result may be interpreted as a weak evidence
obtained by introducing competition.
3.5 Welfare Implications in duopoly model
Under neutrality regime with duopoly platforms surplus of the parties can
be calculated through their equilibrium market participation and proﬁt max-






















Then, taking into account the ISPs’ proﬁts in equation 51 one can ﬁnd
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On the other hand, the components of the total surplus under network
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Then, taking into account the ISPs’ proﬁts in equation 57 one can ﬁnd
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In order to ﬁnd the welfare implications we should ﬁnd the changes in


















which is positive for suﬃciently larger values of additional conection quality
level, z.
The change in regular CAPs surplus can be calculated through the equa-
tions 60 and 64:
∆CAPSRi =
zΩ2
R (z − 2z)
8T
< 0 (68)
which is negative without imposing any requirement.
The change in quality sensitive CAPs surplus can be calculated through
the equations 61 and 65:
∆CAPSQi =





which is positive for suﬃciently larger increase in additional connection qual-
ity level and tolerable diﬀerence between ΩQ and ωQ, which comes from the
requirement (ΩQ (z − z) + ωQ (z + z)) > 0.
Although the diﬀerence in total surplus can be calculated, it can not be
interpreted, since the proﬁt of the duopoly ISPs is undetermined.
184 Concluding remarks
Our analysis which investigates the welfare implications of switching from a
neutrality regime to a network management regime suggests some interesting
results that may contribute to the debate. The primary insight from this
study may refer the potential gains that can be captured through network
management regime. More speciﬁcally, switching from a-bit-is-a-bit principle
may create social beneﬁts at least more than one parties in the market. Both
in monopoly and duopoly models we have observed that EUs and quality-
sensitive CAPs beneﬁt from network management regime in case of enough
increase in quality of connection oﬀered by ISP(s).
On the other hand, it has to be kept in mind that network management
regime primarily requires ISP(s) action. Thus, ISP(s) incentive to switch
network management regime is crucial. Our ﬁndings in the main model with
a monopolist ISP suggest that in case of higher valuation from the EU side for
the quality-sensitive content or applications, and higher revenue parameter
from its providers is a necessary condition for ISP(s) to diﬀerentiate its service
in terms of quality connection. However, in the extended version of the model
(duopoly competition) we have not arrived a deﬁnite conclusion about these
incentives. One can interpret this ﬁnding as a an impact of competition
between ISPs. But, we have not enough evidence to support this argument.
The overall eﬀect of deviation from neutrality regime on total surplus may
not deﬁned clearly in both models. In the main model, with a monopolist
ISP, although we have found that only the regular CAPs suﬀer, we can not
arrive a deﬁnite conclusion for the total welfare. In the extended model
with duopoly competition, regular CAPs still suﬀer, additionally we faces
ambiguous result for the incentive of the ISPs. And, this make the total
surplus undetermined once more.
Before concluding, it has to be emphasized that the main mechanism
which makes the quality-sensitive CAPs and EUs better-oﬀ results from de-
voting the available network resources more to quality-sensitive CAPs. In
contrast with this situation, regular CAPs suﬀer, since the quality of the
connection available for them is less than the neutrality regime. However,
the interesting thing here is, revealing the potential gains through considering
the economic values of data packets with the network management regime.
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